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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
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      Theories suggest that both risk and mispricing are associated with commonality in returns, 
and information associated with this commonality can be used to predict future returns. 
However, empirically implemented factor pricing models rarely incorporate psychological 
factors. I propose to augment standard factor models with behavioral factors to capture 
commonality in mispricing caused by psychological biases. Specifically, I form risk-and-
behavioral composite models and examine whether considering jointly both sources of return 
predictability better explains known return anomalies. I propose two behavioral factors 
motivated by overconfidence and limited attention, respectively, and show that behavioral 
factors differ from standard risk factors in several important respects. I find that the risk-and-
behavioral composite models outperform both standard models and other recent models and fully 
explain a number of well-known anomalies, particularly growth-related anomalies. The evidence 
suggests that behavioral factors play a prominent role in capturing commonality in mispricing 
and should be incorporated into asset pricing models. 
Introduction
In John H. Cochrane’s 2011 AFA Presidential Address (Cochrane (2011)), on discussing the
zoo of new anomalies, he asks three key questions:
“First, which characteristics really provide independent information about
average returns? Second, does each new anomaly variable also correspond to a
new factor formed on those same anomalies? Third, how many of these new
factors are really important (and can account for many characteristics)?”
This is the agenda we pursue in this paper. We propose two behavioral factors based on firm
characteristics that are strong return predictors and are likely to be misvalued by investors because
of their own psychological biases. We introduce a parsimonious model that augments standard
risk-based factor models with behavioral factors, and examine whether behavioral factors help
to explain existing anomalies. We find compelling evidence that, in conjunction with traditional
factors, the two behavioral factors subsume many anomalies and provide incremental information
about average returns relative to standard risk factors.
There are two alternative theories of return comovement. The traditional theory, derived
from economies with rational investors and no frictions, posits that current stock prices closely
reflect fundamentals. Hence, comovement in prices arises solely from comovement in fundamental
values, with common mispricing playing no role because arbitrageurs readily correct any price
inefficiency. In contrast, the alternative theory argues that in economies with irrational investors
and limits of arbitrage, comovement in prices can be delinked from comovement in fundamentals.
For example, in the model of Barberis and Shleifer (2003), investors categorize risky assets
into different characteristics or “styles”, and allocate funds at the style level rather than at individual
asset level. If some of the investors using styles are subject to correlated sentiment, when investors
move funds from one style to another, their correlated demand could drive return comovement of
assets that share the same style, even when these assets’ cash flows are
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uncorrelated. Therefore, shifts in investor sentiment about firm characteristics or styles can cause
commonality in mispricing.
Alternatively, in the overconfidence model of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam
(2001), return comovement can arise when investors misinterpret signals about a fundamental
economic factor. In their model, overconfident investors overestimate the precision of signals they
receive, and accordingly, overreact to private information about the payoffs of genuine economic
factors that influence firms’ profits. Thus, sets of stocks (whose cash flows are derived from these
factors) move together as information about factors arrives, inducing return comovement due to
common mispricing and later correction.
Theories suggest that both risk and mispricing are associated with commonality in returns,
and it is important to include behavioral factors in empirical asset pricing models to capture return
comovement due to common mispricing.1 Risk factors describe firms’ exposure to systematic
risk and the associated risk premium; similarly, behavioral factors describe firms’ exposure to
common mispricing and later correction. Fama and French (1993) construct risk factors based on
firm characteristics proposed to be correlated with risk exposure; similarly, we create behavioral
factors based on characteristics that are likely to be misvalued by investors because of their own
psychological biases.
Several psychological biases have been shown to affect asset prices, and two pronounced
ones are overconfidence and limited attention. Motivated by the overconfidence model of Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001), Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010) propose a behavioral factor,
the underpriced-minus-overpriced (UMO) factor, based on firms’ external financing activities.
1Several other studies also suggest that behavioral biases could affect asset prices systematically. For example,
Goetzmann and Massa (2008) construct a behavioral factor from trades of disposition-prone investors and find that
exposure to this disposition factor seems to be priced. Similarly, Baker and Wurgler (2006) suggest including investor
sentiment in models of prices and expected returns, and Kumar and Lee (2006) show that retail investor sentiment
leads to stock return comovements beyond risk factors.
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The new issues puzzle is well documented. Though there are possible risk channels,2 the widely
held views are behavioral explanations, such as “market timing” and incitement of misvaluation.
The “market timing” hypothesis suggests that managers possess inside information about the true
value of their firms and undertake equity (or debt) issuance or repurchase to exploit pre-existing
mispricing. Alternatively, managers may manipulate earnings upward to induce overpricing
before issuing shares, or manage earnings downward to induce underpricing before a repurchase.3
In those circumstances, issuing firms would be overpriced and repurchasing firms underpriced.
The UMO factor is constructed by going long on firms with debt or equity repurchases and short
on firms with IPOs, SEOs, and debt issues over the previous 24 months. They show that UMO
indeed captures common mispricing, and loadings on UMO predict the cross-section of stock
returns.
We introduce another behavioral factor, the inattention-to-fundamentals (ITF) factor,
motivated by investors’ limited attention to important information about firm fundamentals. In the
fashion of Fama and French (1993), ITF is constructed on a firm characteristic, net operating
assets, which is important balance sheet information but is likely to be neglected by investors.
According to Hirshleifer et al. (2004), net operating assets measures the relative shortfall between
cumulative operating income (the accounting value added) and cumulative free cash flow (the
cash value added). When this shortfall is large, the favorable accounting performance receives
relatively little affirmation from cash performance. If investors with limited attention focus on
accounting profitability but neglect information about cash profitability, then net operating assets
measures “the extent to which reporting outcomes provoke over-optimism.” Firms with high net
operating assets will be overvalued, and firms with low net operating assets will be undervalued.
2There are two possible risk explanations for the new issues puzzle. Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) argue that
equity issuance reduces leverage and in turn systematic risk, and thus is followed by lower future returns. Others
(Berk, Green, and Naik (1999), Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2008), etc.) argue that a lower cost of capital increases
planned investment, and firms issue new shares to fund investment. However, Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010) find that
the leverage and investment channels do not completely explain the abnormal returns associated with equity and debt
financing activities.
3See Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2012), Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim (2012), and Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998)
for recent evidence supporting the behavioral explanations.
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ITF is constructed by going long on low net operating assets firms and short on high net operating
assets firms, to capture common mispricing due to investors’ limited attention to firms’ cash flows
or fundamentals.4
Intuitively, one might ask why there could be a factor associated with net operating assets.
One mechanism is that net operating assets is related to economic factors, and innovations in net
operating assets are systematic. Owing to limited attention, comovement in net operating assets
drives commonality in mispricing and asset returns across firms. Another channel is systematic
attention shocks. At a given time, all firms with high (low) net operating assets are overvalued
(undervalued) due to limited attention. Shifts in aggregate investor attention, or attention shocks,
therefore cause these firms to become more or less misvalued at the same time, generating
comovement in returns. Jointly, both systematic innovations in net operating assets and shifts in
aggregate investor attention drive return comovement due to common mispricing, in particular
among firms with extreme net operating assets. ITF is formed by a long-short strategy on those
firms, and therefore captures common mispricing due to investors’ limited attention to important
information about firm fundamentals. Section 2 provides more discussion about the two channels.
In this paper, we propose to augment the standard factor models (the CAPM, Fama-French,
and Carhart models) with behavioral factors to form risk-and-behavioral composite models, with
behavioral factors designed to capture common mispricing due to investors’ psychological biases.
This approach is consistent with theoretical models in which both risk and mispricing proxies
predict returns (e.g., Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam
(2001)). We expect the two behavioral factors (UMO and ITF) to be correlated, but to capture
4Because net operating assets is related to accruals, which bears potential risk explanations, one argument is that
net operating assets may be related to risk. We view limited attention as the primary motivation for net operating
assets, given existing counter-evidence for risk or rational explanations for accruals. The original Sloan (1996) study
attributes the accruals anomaly to investors’ fixation on earnings, which is in line with limited attention hypotheses.
Khan (2008) suggests an (unidentified) risk factor explanation, while Hirshleifer, Hou, and Teoh (2012) cast doubts
and show that it is the accruals characteristic rather than covariance that predicts returns. Wu, Zhang, and Zhang
(2010) propose a growth-based explanation motivated by the q-theory, i.e., firms increase investment (and thus have
higher accruals) when discount rates are low. However, Chu (2012) show that accruals is not subsumed by measures
of growth, so that investment/growth cannot completely explain the accruals anomaly. Collectively, we argue that
mispricing is currently the predominant explanation for the accruals anomaly.
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common mispricing in different respects. While UMO is implied by the inside information
managers possess about the true value of their firms, ITF is derived from investors’ limited
attention to important balance sheet information that reveals firm fundamentals. Both UMO and
ITF are constructed on firm characteristics related to future growth; thus we further posit that, in
particular, UMO and ITF capture common mispricing related to firms’ long-term growth
prospects.
We empirically assess the incremental contribution of behavioral factors to capturing 21
well-known return anomalies, in particular long-term growth-related anomalies. We compare risk-
and-behavioral composite models with standard models (CAPM, FF3 and Carhart) and other recent
models, including the profitability factor model of Novy-Marx (2013), the Fama-French five-factor
model (FF5) of Fama and French (2014), and the q-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2014).
We find that across around 20 high-minus-low anomaly portfolios, the average magnitude of alphas
is about 0.14% per month under the composite CAPM, FF3 and Carhart models, in contrast to
0.27% under the FF5 model, 0.22% under the profitability model, and 0.20% under the q-factor
model. In addition, none of the high-minus-low alphas is significant at the 5% level under the
composite CAPM, in contrast to 8 under the FF5 model, 5 under the profitability model, and 5
under the q-factor model. Overall, the risk-and-behavioral composite models outperform standard
models and other recent models and fully explain almost all anomalies examined, while showing
relatively weak power to the leverage, ROE, and ROA effects. Our evidence suggests that both risk
and mispricing are important sources of return comovement and predictability.
There are several other notable findings. First, the Fama-French five-factor model and the
q-factor model (with built-in investment factors) do not fully explain several investment-related
anomalies, such as the total accruals, investment-to-asset, and inventory changes effects, whereas
the risk-and-behavioral composite models do. Second, though neither UMO nor ITF is
constructed directly on profitability measures, the composite CAPM performs comparable to the
profitability model and the q-factor model (with built-in profitability factors) and fully explains
several profitability effects.
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If UMO and ITF are indeed behavioral factors that capture common mispricing, then firm
loadings on UMO and ITF measure the exposure to systematically mispriced fundamental factors
or growth-related characteristics, and therefore should positively predict the cross-section of stock
returns. Loadings estimated at firm level are rather imprecise. Instead, we use a portfolio shrinkage
method and estimate firms’ conditional UMO or ITF loadings from annually balanced portfolios
sorted by mispricing proxies (external financing or net operating assets, respectively). Using Fama-
MacBeth cross-sectional regressions, we show that conditional UMO and ITF loadings positively
and significantly predict future stock returns, even after controlling for a set of standard return
predictors, firm characteristics, and firm loadings on other competing factors.
Next, we show how behavioral factors differ from standard risk factors. If UMO and ITF
do account for common mispricing, then firm loadings on UMO and ITF should be fairly unstable
over time. A common presumption of many, though not all, studies of risk factors (in tests at the
monthly frequency) is that loadings are persistent over periods of 3 to 5 years. However, the same
presumption does not apply for behavioral factors. Though a firm characteristic (upon which the
behavioral factor is constructed) can be persistently mispriced by the market, for a given firm it
will not stay over- or underpriced forever.5 The stock price fluctuates between mispriced and fairly
priced, as mispricing occurs and is corrected. Therefore, unlike standard risk factors, we expect
UMO and ITF loadings to be rather unstable over long horizons such as 3 to 5 years, and we find
compelling evidence consistent with that hypothesis.
Finally, we conduct a set of robustness tests and provide additional evidence supportive of
UMO and ITF as behavioral factors. Specifically, to evaluate ITF as an inattention factor, we
examine how ITF factor returns comove with aggregate investors’ attention to the stock market. If
ITF captures common mispricing due to investors’ limited attention, ITF returns measure the extent
of mispricing correction. The lower the attention to firm fundamentals, the greater the mispricing,
and the larger the ITF returns subsequently. Using two market state variables (sentiment and
5This is based on the assumption that mispricing tends to be temporary and reverses out during a period of three to
five years.
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turnover) as proxies for aggregate investors’ attention, we find consistent evidence that ITF returns
comove with our attention proxies in expected directions.
On the premise that sophisticated investors help to mitigate or alleviate mispricing, we look
at average UMO and ITF loadings across portfolios ranked by investor sophistication proxies,
such as institutional ownership and analyst coverage. If UMO and ITF are indeed behavioral
factors and loadings on UMO and ITF measure the degree of mispricing, we expect firms with high
institutional ownership or analyst coverage to have smaller UMO and ITF loadings (in absolute
terms). We find evidence consistent with our hypotheses, particularly among small and medium-
sized firms. It seems that sophisticated investors are more efficient in mitigating mispricing for
smaller firms, but not much so for larger firms.
This study contributes to a growing literature on asset pricing and return anomalies in several
ways. First, we propose a risk-and-behavioral composite model that augments standard risk-based
factor models with behavioral factors, and empirically examine the performance of the composite
models relative to standard models in explaining existing anomalies. We find that two behavioral
factors (UMO and ITF) help to account for around 20 well-known anomalies, especially long-term
growth anomalies. Our evidence suggests that investor irrationality can aggregate and affect asset
prices systematically, and behavioral factors play a prominent role in capturing return comovement
due to common mispricing. Therefore, it is useful to consider both behavior-motivated and risk-
based return factors in understanding return comovement and predictability.
Our findings also help to answer the three questions raised by Cochrane’s AFA Presidential
Address. We show that two factors, formed on external financing and net operating assets,
respectively, can subsume many characteristics and provide incremental information about
average returns. This suggests that UMO and ITF could serve as a practical benchmark for
identifying new anomalies in the future.
Second, our inattention-to-fundamentals (ITF) factor provides a new way of capturing
fluctuations in aggregate investor attention. Though the idea is motivated by previous studies, no
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study has actually constructed an inattention factor and examined its ability in explaining the
cross-section of stock returns.
Last, we evaluate how behavioral factors differ from standard risk factors. Following
Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010), we show that, unlike the most well known risk factors, firm loadings
on behavioral factors are rather unstable over long horizons of 3 to 5 years. In addition, we find
that ITF factor returns fluctuate with proxies for aggregate investor attention, justifying it as an
inattention factor. We also find that firms with higher investor sophistication have smaller
loadings on behavioral factors (in absolute terms), consistent with the notion that sophisticated
investors help mitigate mispricing.
1 Motivation for an Inattention-to-Fundamentals Factor
Investors have limited attention and cognitive processing power. Theory predicts that
limited investor attention causes systematic errors and affects asset prices (Hirshleifer and Teoh
(2003); Peng and Xiong (2006); Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2011)). Accounting numbers are
often associated with firm fundamentals and future asset returns. If investors pay insufficient
attention to an accounting number that conveys important information about future cash flows,
they will overlook certain aspects of a firm’s fundamentals. As a result, all firms sharing similar
fundamentals will be misvalued simultaneously, leading to systematic mispricing and return
comovement as mispricing occurs and is corrected. In this sense, the inattention-to-fundamentals
(ITF) factor is essential to capture return comovement due to investors’ limited attention to firms’
cash flows or fundamentals.
1.1 Why net operating assets?
To construct the ITF factor, it is useful to look at accounting-based anomalies and find a
firm characteristic that both reveals fundamentals and is neglected by investors. We construct
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ITF on net operating assets. According to Hirshleifer et al. (2004), a firm’s net operating assets
measures the cumulative deviation between accounting profitability and cash profitability, or to
what extent a firm’s balance sheet is “bloated.” Good accounting performance is less sustainable
than good cash performance. Hence, high net operating assets is an indicator that past accounting
performance has been good but is less likely to be sustained in the future. If investors focus on
accounting performance but pay insufficient attention to cash performance, they will overestimate
the sustainability of accounting performance; therefore, firms with high net operating assets will
be overvalued and firms with low net operating assets will be undervalued. Such mispricing can
spread systematically and affect all firms with similarly “bloated” balance sheets.
An alternative proxy for investor misperception is accruals, which is also a negative return
predictor in line with the limited attention theory. Hirshleifer et al. (2004) show that net operating
assets can be decomposed as the sum of cumulative operating accruals and cumulative
investments. While accruals provides only a single-period fragment of the degree to which
reporting/operating outcomes provoke over-optimism, net operating assets reflects the whole
history of flows. Therefore, net operating assets is a more complete proxy for investor
misperceptions than the flow measure of accruals. Indeed, Hirshleifer et al. (2004) find that net
operating assets has greater power, over a longer horizon, to predict returns than accruals.
Net operating assets is also an accounting number that incorporates many aspects of
fundamentals. For example, earnings management, investment activities, and external financing
(that is invested in operating assets) all contribute to the growth of net operating assets. Since
UMO is formed on external financing activities, ITF to some extent overlaps with UMO, but does
not subsume UMO. We expect ITF and UMO to be correlated, but capture common mispricing
derived from different aspects. While ITF is derived from investors’ limited attention to important
balance sheet information that reveals firm fundamentals, UMO is implied by managers’ inside
information about the true value of their firms.
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1.2 Why is net operating assets associated with a factor?
We construct ITF using a long-short strategy on extreme net operating assets firms. On the
premise that net operating assets is overvalued by investors with limited attention, ITF captures
return comovement through two possible channels.
One channel is systematic shifts in investor attention (or attention shocks). At a given time,
all firms with high (low) net operating assets are overvalued (undervalued) because of limited
investor attention. Shifts in aggregate investor attention, or attention shocks, therefore cause these
firms to become more or less misvalued at the same time, generating return comovement.6
Examples of attention shocks include worldwide sports events and holidays. Using Google
web search data about sports news, Schmidt (2013) finds that during sporting events, investors
reallocate their attention from the stock market toward sports, trading weakens, and stock prices
incorporate less firm-specific information. Jacobs and Weber (2012) and Frieder and
Subrahmanyam (2004) show that turnover drops during both local and national holidays. Hong
and Yu (2009) provide international evidence that aggregate trading activity is lower during
summer holiday periods, which they call a “gone fishin” effect. On the other hand, the dot-com
bubble may have been a low attention shock, when investors were exuberant about growth
opportunities and did not pay attention to cash flows. Publicity about accounting frauds, such as
fall of Enron, may serve as high attention shocks, because such events increase accounting
concerns and cause investors to look more carefully at accounting information.7
The other channel is systematic innovations in net operating assets. If net operating assets
is related to fundamental or economic factors, then innovations in net operating assets can be
systematic. Owing to limited attention, comovement in net operating assets drives commonality
6Formal modeling on this intuition can be provided upon request.
7But more generally, many shocks have both fundamental effects and attentional effects. For example, the fall of
Enron increases investors’ attention to accounting information; on the other hand, it also weakens firms’ incentive to
manage earnings.
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in mispricing and asset returns across firms. There are several possible mechanisms generating
systematic innovations in net operating assets.
For example, firms’ incentive to manage earnings are correlated. In general, earnings
beats/misses are systematic across firms. When the economy is doing well, many firms beat
forecasts, and when the economy is falling, many firms miss them. Given the condition of the
economy, the incentive to manipulate earnings by accruals is the same for many firms, leading to
systematic innovations in net operating assets. Alternatively, at a given time, a group of firms,
sharing certain styles or similar sensitivity to technological or economic shocks, may face
similarly rich growth opportunities. These firms have a strong need to raise external capital and
expand investment, all of which increase net operating assets. In this case, common exposure to
growth opportunity leads to systematic innovations in net operating assets across firms.
Collectively, both systematic shifts in investor attention and systematic innovations in net
operating assets drive return comovement due to common mispricing, especially among firms with
extreme net operating assets. ITF is formed by a long-short strategy on those extreme firms, and
therefore captures common mispricing due to investors’ limited attention to important information
about firm fundamentals, such as net operating assets.
2 Empirical Comparison of Behavioral Factors with Other
Factors
2.1 Factor construction
In this section, we compare two behavioral factors (UMO and ITF) with other common
factors. UMO is from Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010), constructed by going long on firms with debt
or equity repurchases and short on firms with IPOs, SEOs, and debt issuances over the previous 24
months.
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ITF is constructed on net operating assets, following Fama and French (1993). Net operating
assets is computed using Compustat annual files, following Hirshleifer et al. (2004). In June of
each year t, all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks with nonmissing size and net operating
assets are assigned to two size groups (small “S” or big “B”) based on whether their end-of-June
market equity is below or above the NYSE median ME breakpoint. Independently, all stocks are
sorted into three net operating assets groups (low “L”, middle “M”, or high “H”) based on their net
operating assets for all fiscal years ending in year t − 1, using the bottom 30%, middle 40%, and
top 70% breakpoints for NYSE firms. Six portfolios (SL, SM, SH, BL, BM, and BH) are formed
as the intersections. The portfolios are held over the next 12 months (from July of year t to June
of year t+ 1) and value-weighted monthly returns of each portfolio are computed. The ITF factor
premium is the equal-weighted average return of low net operating assets portfolios (SL and BL)
minus the equal-weighted average return of high net operating assets portfolios (SH and BH). That
is, ITF = (SL+BL)/2− (SH +BH)/2.
For comparison, we also include standard factors (MKT, SMB, HML, and MOM), the
liquidity factor (LIQ) of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), the profitability factor (PMU) of
Novy-Marx (2013), the investment and profitability factors (CMA and RMW) of Fama and
French (2014), and the investment and profitability factors (INV and ROE) of Hou, Xue, and
Zhang (2014). Monthly returns of MKT, SMB, HML, MOM, CMA, and RMW are downloaded
from Kenneth French’s website. Monthly series of LIQ and UMO are downloaded from
corresponding authors’ websites, respectively. PMU is constructed following Novy-Marx (2013),
by going long on firms with high gross profit-to-asset ratios and short on firms with low gross
profits-to-asset ratios.8
INV and ROE are constructed by a triple sort following Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2014). First,
all stocks are sorted into two size, three asset growth, and three ROE groups using NYSE
breakpoints, resulting in 18 intersection portfolios. Consistent with their paper, size and asset
8Here, we use the original PMU factor unadjusted by industry. We did not observe significant improvement on
either factor premium or Sharpe ratio for adjusted PMU, HML, and MOM, constructed following Novy-Marx (2013);
instead, most factors perform worse after adjustment.
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growth are updated annually, while ROE is updated quarterly. INV factor return is the difference
between the equal-weighted average returns of six low-asset growth portfolios and six high-asset
growth portfolios. Similarly, ROE factor return is the difference between equal-weighted average
returns of six high-ROE portfolios and six low-ROE portfolios. In their model, they also include a
size factor ME, which is the difference between equal-weighted average returns of nine small-size
portfolios and nine large-size portfolios.
2.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for factor returns. Panel A describes factor premium,
standard deviations, time-series t-statistics, and Sharpe ratios. UMO offers the highest average
premium of 91 basis points per month and the highest Sharpe ratio of 0.30. ITF offers an average
premium of 32 basis points per month and a Sharpe ratio of 0.20. In comparison with other factors,
though INV has a higher Sharpe ratio of 0.23 than ITF (probably due to their high correlation), in
Table 3 and Table 4, we show that ITF completely explains INV, but INV does not fully explain
ITF, suggesting that ITF carries incremental information to INV.
Panel B reports pairwise correlation between factors. ITF seems to be quite distinct from
standard factors, with a correlation of -0.12 with MKT, -0.01 with SMB, -0.19 with HML, and 0.18
with MOM. ITF has moderate correlation with PMU (0.22), INV (0.26), and CMA (0.21). UMO
is strongly and positively correlated with HML (0.62), INV (0.56), and CMA (0.62), suggesting
that UMO may contain information related to these factors. The correlation between UMO and
ITF is only 0.06.9
9Generally, we expect the correlation between UMO and ITF to be not very high because each is designed to
capture a different force of common misvaluation, but a correlation as low as 0.06 is a bit puzzling. In untabulated
tests, we check correlation in four subperiods: 1972-1982, 1983-1992, 1993-2002, and 2003-2012. Correlations in
the first two subperiods are 0.22 and 0.43; in the latter two subperiods, they are -0.07 and -0.05. Thus, the overall low
correlation seems to be attributable to the extremely low (and even negative) correlation after 1993. What happens
in the latter periods that drives the distinctive performance of UMO and ITF is still a puzzling question to be further
explored.
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Panel C describes portfolio weights, returns, and the maximum ex post Sharpe ratios that
can be achieved by combining various factors to form the tangency portfolios. Row (1) shows
that the maximum Sharpe ratio by combining the Fama-French three factors is 0.22. In row (2),
adding MOM and LIQ factors with the Fama-French three factors increases the maximum Sharpe
ratio from 0.22 to 0.33; in row (3), adding recent investment and profitability factors (PMU, INV,
ROE, RMW, and CMA) increases the maximum Sharpe ratio from 0.22 to 0.41; and in row (4),
adding all recent factors (MOM, LIQ, PMU, INV, ROE, RMW, and CMA) increases the maximum
Sharpe ratio from 0.22 to 0.44. Row (5) shows that combining the Fama-French three factors
with two behavioral factors (UMO and ITF) can increase the maximum Sharpe ratio from 0.22 to
0.47, even higher than in row (3) with all other factors. In row (6), when including all factors,
the tangency portfolio places the highest weights on UMO and ITF (21% and 27%). Overall, the
evidence suggests that investors can be substantially better off by considering behavioral factors
when deriving the optimal tangency portfolio.
2.3 Comparing ITF with accruals and asset growth factors
According to accounting identities, net operating assets relates to accruals and asset growth,
and both (especially accruals) are also subject to investors’ limited attention. A reasonable question
is why we pick net operating assets rather than accruals or asset growth to construct the limited
attention factor. Previous studies have shown that the net operating assets anomaly is incremental
to, and more persistent than, the accruals and asset growth effect (Hirshleifer et al. (2004); Cao
(2011)).10 To show further evidence, we construct an accruals factor (ACC, as the “CMA” factor in
Hirshleifer, Hou, and Teoh (2012)) and an asset growth factor (AG), respectively, and test whether
ITF subsumes ACC and AG.
10Hirshleifer et al. (2004) decompose net operating assets to cumulative operating accruals plus cumulative
investment. Cao (2011) shows that the total asset growth can be decomposed into net operating assets growth and
two additional components that have no return predictability, which suggests that the total asset growth anomaly is a
noisy manifestation of the net operating assets growth anomaly.
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Table 2 reports factor premiums and Sharpe ratios of ACC and AG. Both factors earn lower
premiums and lower Sharpe ratios than ITF. The AG factor is rather weak; except for CAPM,
standard models like the Fama-French and Carhart models fully explain AG premiums. Adding
ITF to the Carhart model further reduces alpha to -0.03% (t = −0.45). ACC is stronger than AG,
and none of the standard models fully captures ACC premiums. But after adding ITF to the Carhart
model, alpha is significantly reduced, from 0.22% (t = 2.64) to 0.11% (t = 1.39). In contrast, ITF
is much stronger than both ACC and AG, earning large and significant alphas under all standard
models. Adding AG or ACC to the Carhart model only marginally reduces alphas from 0.39%
(t = 5.20) to 0.34% (t = 5.07) or to 0.35% (t = 4.97), respectively. Overall, we see that ITF earns
higher premiums and a higher Sharpe ratio than ACC and AG. ITF subsumes ACC and AG, but
not vice versa. This suggests that ITF better captures commonality in mispricing than ACC and
AG.
2.4 Comparing behavioral factors with other factors
In this section, we examine to what extent standard factors and other recent factors explain
the performance of behavioral factors, and to what extent behavioral factors explain other factors.
Table 3 shows that the Fama-French three-factor model, the Carhart model, and the liquidity factor
do not explain UMO and ITF premiums. Other recent models such as the profitability factor model,
the Fama-French five-factor model, and the q-factor model do not explain UMO and ITF either.
UMO and ITF earn large and significant alphas under all those models. In a “kitchen sink” model
with all standard and recent factors, ITF still earns an alpha of 0.23% per month (t = 3.29), and
UMO earns an alpha of 0.41% per month (t = 3.64). This suggests that UMO and ITF offer
abnormally high returns relative to all other factors.
Table 4 shows how behavioral factors explain the performance of other factors. By simply
supplementing CAPM with UMO and ITF, most factor premiums are fully explained, except for
the liquidity factor (LIQ) and profitability factors (RMW and ROE). For example, the model alpha
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for HML is driven down from 0.52% (t = 3.19) to 0.03% (t = 0.24), MOM alpha is reduced from
0.76% (t = 3.84) to 0.33% (t = 1.30), and INV alpha is down from 0.55% (t = 5.82) to 0.08%
(t = 0.92). Though UMO and ITF do not fully explain RMW and ROE premiums, RMW alpha
is significantly reduced from 0.34% (t = 2.77) to 0.22% (t = 1.96), and ROE alpha is reduced
from 0.61% (t = 4.72) to 0.36% (t = 2.10). On the other hand, behavioral factors show little
explanatory power for LIQ and SMB (with merely zero loadings), suggesting that LIQ and SMB
may indeed capture some sources of risk.
Collectively, Table 3 and Table 4 show that UMO and ITF are able to fully capture many
other common factors, but not vice versa. The evidence suggests that UMO and ITF contain
incremental information about return comovement. Therefore, we conjecture that adding UMO
and ITF to standard factor models help improve the models’ explanatory power.
3 Factor Regressions on Hedged Anomaly Portfolios
Following Fama and French (1993, 1996), we use factor regressions to examine how
behavioral factors help to capture various return anomalies. Because UMO is built upon firms’
financing activities and ITF is built upon a component of firms’ cumulative operating income,
both related to firms’ long-term growth prospects, we posit that UMO and ITF capture return
comovement due to common mispricing on long-term growth. We examine the explanatory
power of UMO and ITF for various robust anomalies, in particular growth-related anomalies. We
consider 21 anomalies classified into four categories:
Standard anomalies (3): size, book-to-market, and momentum, which are to some extent
related to growth and also well-known ingredients in standard factor models.
Investment-related anomalies (9): total accruals (Sloan (1996)), net operating assets
(Hirshleifer et al. (2004)), total asset growth (Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008)), abnormal capital
investment (Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004)), investment-to-asset ratio (Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang
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(2008)), investment-to-capital ratio (Polk and Sapienza (2009)), investment growth (Xing (2008)),
inventory growth (Belo and Lin (2012)), and inventory changes (Thomas and Zhang (2002)).
Financing-related anomalies (6): external financing (Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan
(2006)), net composite issuance (Daniel and Titman (2006)), share issuance (Pontiff and
Woodgate (2008)), leverage effect (Ferguson and Shockley (2003)), total payout and net payout
(Boudoukh et al. (2007)).
Profitability-related anomalies (3): gross profit-to-asset (Novy-Marx (2013)),
return-on-equity and return-on-asset effects.11
Table 5, Panel A, reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between anomaly
characteristics. We confirm that most characteristics are not highly correlated and stand as
relatively independent anomalies, except for two groups such as net operating assets/total asset
growth/investment-to-asset ratio and leverage/total (net) payout.
3.1 Summary of comparative model performance
To examine the incremental contribution of behavioral factors in explaining various
anomalies, we supplement UMO and ITF into standard factor models (CAPM, FF3, and Carhart
models) to form risk-and-behavioral composite models. Then, we run factor regressions on test
portfolios formed on various anomaly variables. If a model is efficient, the regression alpha of the
H-L portfolio should be statistically indistinguishable from zero. We compare the performance of
the composite models with both standard models and other recent models, including the
profitability factor model of Novy-Marx (2013), the Fama-French five-factor model (FF5) of
Fama and French (2014), and the q-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2014).12
11ROE and ROA portfolios are generated by monthly sorts on quarterly updated ROE and ROA. Consistent with the
literature, we find that annually updated ROE and ROA do not significantly predict future returns.
12In untabulated results, I also check the performance of the liquidity factor model of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)
(adding the traded liquidity factor (LIQ) to the Carhart model), and find that the liquidity factor (LIQ) does not help to
explain these anomalies.
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Table 5, Panel B, summarizes the comparative performance of the risk-and-behavioral
composite models in explaining a number of long-term growth-related anomalies. We report
regression alphas of each hedged anomaly portfolio under different factor models. We see that by
simply adding two behavioral factors to CAPM, the composite CAPM can fully subsume all
investment, financing, and profitability-related anomalies examined here. Comparing the
composite CAPM with other recent models, we see that the composite CAPM outperforms the
the profitability model, the FF5 model, and the q-factor model in explaining many of these
anomalies, such as accruals, investment-to-asset, inventory changes, composite issuance, net
share issuance, etc. Adding behavioral factors to FF3 and Carhart models shows similarly strong
explanatory power, except for the ROE and ROA effects, because SMB and HML explain the
effects in the wrong direction.
At the bottom of Panel B, we report the average alphas of all hedged anomaly portfolios
under each factor model, as well as the average absolute alphas (|α|). Because both positive and
negative alphas indicate meaningful abnormal returns, we particularly look at absolute alphas. We
find that average |α| under standard factor models (CAPM, FF3, and Carhart) ranges from 0.32%
to 0.58% per month. Among other recent models, the average |α| is 0.27% per month under
the FF5 model, 0.22% per month under the profitability model, and 0.20% under the q-factor
model. In contrast, the average |α| is only 0.14% under the composite CAPM, 0.15% under the
composite FF3, and 0.13% under the composite Carhart model, all substantially smaller than that
under standard models and other recent models.
In addition, among the 19 anomalies listed (book-to-market and momentum are excluded
because they are tested in two-way sorted portfolios, not in deciles), 8 of them earn significant
alphas (at 5% level) under the FF5 model; 5 of them earn significant alphas (at 5% level) under the
profitability model and the q-factor models. In contrast, none of them earn significant alphas under
the composite CAPM, while 2 of them earn significant alphas (at 5% level) under the composite
FF3 and composite Carhart models.
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There are several other notable findings. First, the FF5 model and the q-factor model (with
built-in investment factors) do not fully explain several investment-related anomalies, such as the
total accruals, investment-to-asset and inventory changes effects, whereas the risk-and-behavioral
composite models do. Second, though neither UMO nor ITF is constructed directly on profitability
measures, the composite CAPM performs comparable to the profitability model and the q-factor
model (with built-in profitability factors) and fully explains several profitability effects.
Overall, the risk-and-behavioral composite models dominate other models in explaining
almost all anomalies examined here, though showing relatively weak power to the leverage, ROE,
and ROA effects.
Next we present detailed factor regression results for each anomaly. For conciseness, we
only show statistics for the High-minus-Low (H-L) portfolios. Table 6 reports H-L
book-to-market and momentum portfolios in each size quintile, and Table 7 reports H-L
portfolios of all other anomalies. Monthly returns of the 25 size and book-to-market portfolios
and 25 size and momentum portfolios are downloaded from Kenneth French’s website. For all
other anomalies except size, composite issuance (IR), ROEQ, and ROAQ, the decile portfolios are
formed as follows. In June of each year t, all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks are sorted into
deciles based on the anomaly variable measured as of fiscal year ending in year t− 1 using NYSE
breakpoints. Monthly value-weighted portfolio returns are calculated from July of year t to June
of year t + 1, and the portfolios are rebalanced in June of year t + 1. For size and composite
issuance (IR), the decile portfolios are formed similarly each June, but using variables measured
at the end of June in year t. ROEQ and ROAQ are computed using quarterly updated Compustat
files, and ROEQ and ROAQ portfolios are sorted and rebalanced every month. Anomalies
variables are defined in the Appendix.
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3.2 Book-to-market, momentum, and size effects
Book-to-market
Table 6, Panel A, reports factor regressions of high-minus-low book-to-market portfolios in
each size quintile. Column 2 reports the mean percent excess return (Re) of each H-L portfolio.
On average, the value-minus-growth (or H-L) portfolio return is 1.03% per month (t = 4.37) for
the smallest size quintile and 0.20% per month (t = 0.98) for the largest size quintile. Columns
3, 4, 5 report H-L alphas under the CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model (FF3), and the
Carhart model, none of which fully captures the B/M effect. H-L alphas are large and significantly
different from zero in both the small and big quintiles. Columns 6, 7, 8 show that the profitability
factor model, the Fama-French five-factor model (FF5), and the q-factor model perform better, but
still do not fully explain the B/M effect. Columns 9, 10, 11 show the performance of the risk-
and-behavioral composite models. Overall, adding behavioral factors to standard factor models
significantly improves explanatory power. In particular, the composite CAPM outperforms all
other models and fully captures the value effect, except in the smallest size quintile (α = 0.38%
and t = 2.10).
Momentum
Table 6, Panel B, reports factor regressions of high-minus-low momentum portfolios in
each size quintile. Column 2 shows that, on average, the H-L portfolio return ranges from 0.66%
per month in the biggest size quintile to 1.44% per month in the smallest size quintile, and is
statistically significant across all size quintiles. In columns 3, 4 and 5, standard models like the
CAPM and FF3 model show no explanatory power at all, and the Carhart model largely explains
the momentum effect in medium-sized and big quintiles, but not in the two small quintiles.
Columns 6, 7, 8 show that the profitability factor model performs comparably to the Carhart
model, owing to the inclusion of the MOM factor; that the FF5 model does not explain the
momentum effect at all; and that the q-factor model performs even better than the Carhart model,
with H-L alpha significant only for the smallest quintile, probably owing to the high correlation
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between its ROE factor and the MOM factor (corr = 0.60, Table 1). In columns 9, 10, 11,
comparing Comp.CAPM and Comp.FF3 with CAPM and FF3, we see that behavioral factors
help fully capture the momentum effect among large and medium-sized firms, but not among
small firms. Adding UMO and ITF to standard models leads them to outperform the CAPM and
FF3 model, but not the Carhart model or q-factor model.
Size or market equity
Table 7, column 2, reports factor regressions on high-minus-low size or market equity
portfolios. Banz (1981) documents the size effect and Fama and French (1993) create a size
factor, SMB, and use it as a risk factor to explain cross-sectional stock returns. In this section, we
test to what extent the size effect can be explained by behavioral factors. Column 2, Panel A,
shows the size effect. On average, small firms earn higher returns than big firms, and the
big-minus-small or H-L portfolio earns an average return of −0.38% per month, but this is not
statistically significant. This is probably because the size effect has become weaker over recent
decades. The MKT factor alone in CAPM can reduce H-L alpha to −0.27% with t = −1.05.
Adding the SMB, HML and MOM factors can further reduce the H-L alphas to 0.11% in the
Fama-French model and to −0.01% in the Carhart model. Panels B to G show that the
profitability factors (PMU, RMW, and ROE) and behavioral factors (UMO and ITF) have no
explanatory power for the size effect, while the investment factor (INV) can partially account for
this effect. Overall, the evidence suggests that the two behavioral factors do not explain the size
effect. It seems that the SMB factor indeed captures some part of return comovement and
predictability that does not overlap with comovement due to common misvaluation.
3.3 Investment-related anomalies
In this section, we examine how behavioral factors help to explain 9 investment-related
anomalies, such as total accruals (Sloan (1996)), net operating assets (Hirshleifer et al. (2004)),
total asset growth (Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008)), abnormal capital investment (Titman, Wei,
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and Xie (2004)), investment-to-asset ratio (Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2008)),
investment-to-capital ratio (Polk and Sapienza (2009)), investment growth (Xing (2008)),
inventory growth (Belo and Lin (2012)), and inventory changes (Thomas and Zhang (2002)).
Total Accruals
Table 7, Panel A, shows that, on average, high accruals firms earn lower returns than low
accruals firms, and the H-L accruals decile earns an average return of −0.29% per month, with
t = −2.13. The H-L alphas range from−0.36% (t = −2.56) under CAPM to−0.25% (t = −1.63)
under the Carhart model. Panels B, C, and D show that the profitability model, the FF5 model,
and the investment model all perform badly, because the profitability factors (PMU, RMW, and
ROE) go in the wrong direction in explaining the accruals anomaly. Panels E, F, and G show that
behavioral factors completely explain the accruals effect. After adding UMO and ITF to standard
models, H-L alphas are reduced to zero. Such strong explanatory power derives mostly from the
ITF factor.
Asset Growth (AG)
Table 7, Panel A, shows that firms with higher asset growth, on average, earn lower future
returns, and the H-L decile earns an average return of −0.52% per month, which is statistically
significant (t = −2.94). The CAPM and FF3 models do not explain the asset growth effect, while
the Carhart model fully explains it by reducing the H-L alpha to −0.20% (t = −1.33). Panels
B, C, and D show that the profitability factors (PMU, RMW, and ROE) exhibit no explanatory
power at all, while the investment factors (INV and CMA) fully explain the anomaly, which is
not surprising as both factors are constructed based on asset growth (or related characteristics).
Panels E, F, and G show that behavioral factors completely subsume the asset growth effect. After
supplementing UMO and ITF to CAPM, the H-L alpha is close to zero, with α = 0.08 (t = 0.45).
Adding behavioral factors to the Fama-French or Carhart model also significantly improves the
models’ performance, by reducing H-L alpha to 0.11% and 0.12%, respectively, both of which are
insignificant.
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Net operating assets (NOA)
Table 7, Panel A, shows that the H-L decile earns a statistically significant average return of
−0.42% per month. None of the standard models can fully explain the net operating assets
anomaly. The H-L alphas of all standard models are large and significant, ranging from −0.43%
(t = −2.89) to −0.55% (t = −3.42). In Panels B, C, and D, the profitability model and FF5
model do not capture the NOA effect, with H-L alphas equal −0.32% (t = −2.13) and −0.49%
(t = −2.59), respectively. The q-factor model reduce alpha to −0.27% (t = −1.61), still large but
insignificant. Panels E, F, and G show that behavioral factors can completely subsume the net
operating assets anomaly. After adding UMO and ITF to the standard models, H-L alphas are
reduced to close to around 0.10%. The superior performance is expected because ITF is
constructed on firms’ net operating assets characteristics.
Investment-to-asset (IVA)
Table 7, Panel A, confirms that high-IVA firms subsequently earn low average returns, and
the H-L portfolio earns an average return of −0.57% (t = −3.66). The IVA effect is fairly strong
and none of the standard models explains it. Panels B, C, and D show that the profitability factors
(PMU, RMW, and ROE) have no explanatory power, or explain it in the wrong direction. The
investment factors (INV and CMA) partially capture the effect but do not fully explain it. Panels
E, F, and G show that adding behavioral factors to standard models fully captures the IVA effect
by reducing the H-L alphas to around −0.10% per month, which is insignificant. Both UMO and
ITF contribute to explaining the anomaly,
though ITF shows stronger power. Overall, the IVA effect is robust under both standard models
and other recent models, while behavioral factors can fully explain it.
Inventory changes (IvC)
Table 7, Panel A, confirms that high-IvC firms subsequently earn low average returns, and
the H-L portfolio earns an average return of −0.44% (t = −3.16). None of the standard models
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captures of IvC effect. Panels B, C, and D show that the investment factors (INV and CMA) help
capture the effect, but the profitability factors (PMU, RMW, and ROE) explain it in the wrong
direction. Therefore, H-L alphas stay large and significant under the profitability model, the FF5
model, and the q-factor model. Panels E, F, and G show that adding behavioral factors to standard
models fully captures the IvC effect by reducing the H-L alphas to close to zero. Overall, the IvC
effect is fairly robust under both standard models and other recent models, while behavioral factors
fully capture it (mostly by ITF).
ACI, IK, IG, and IvG
We find similar results for abnormal capital investment (ACI), investment-to-capital ratio
(IK), investment growth (IG), and inventory growth (IvG). The hedged ACI portfolio earns an
excess return of−0.26% (t = −1.66), the hedged IG portfolio earns a significant return of−0.46%
(t = −3.12), the hedged IvG portfolio earns a significant return of −0.46% (t = −3.30), while
the hedged IK portfolio earns an insignificant return of −0.37% (t = −1.36). Adding UMO and
ITF to the standard factor models helps to reduce excess returns of all hedged portfolios to close
to zero, outperforming or comparable with other recent models.
To summarize, the two behavioral factors show strong explanatory power to the set of
investment-related anomalies. Adding behavioral factors to standard factor models help fully
subsume all anomalies and reduce H-L alphas toward zero. The risk-and-behavioral composite
models outperform other recent models in explaining many of these anomalies. In particular, the
FF5 model and q-factor model fail to capture accruals, net operating assets, investment-to-asset,
and inventory changes, even with investment factors (INV and CMA) in the models.
3.4 Financing-related anomalies
This section examines how behavioral factors contribute to explaining 6 financing-related
anomalies, such as external financing (Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2006)), net composite
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issuance (Daniel and Titman (2006)), share issuance (Pontiff and Woodgate (2008)), leverage effect
(Ferguson and Shockley (2003)), total payout and net payout (Boudoukh et al. (2007)).
Composite issuance (IR)
Table 7, Panel A, confirms the IR effect, with the H-L IR portfolio earning a highly significant
average return of −0.64% per month. None of the standard models captures this anomaly, with
H-L alphas ranging from a highly significant −0.40% to −0.86% per month. Panels B, C, and D
show that the investment factors (INV and CMA) and profitability factors (PMU, RMW, and ROE)
do not fully explain the IR effect, with H-L alpha ranging from a highly significant −0.29% and
−0.35% per month. In contrast, the behavioral factors fully subsume this IR effect. Panels E, F,
and G show that after incorporating behavioral factors into standard models, the H-L alphas range
from −0.13% (t = −0.95) to −0.19% (t = −1.43). Overall, the behavioral factors fully capture
the IR effect, which is not fully accounted for by standard models or other factor models.
EXFIN, NS, O/P, and NO/P
Similar results are found for external financing (EXFIN), net share issuance (NS), total
payout (O/P), and net payout (NO/P). The hedged EXFIN portfolio earns an excess return of
−0.40% (t = −1.92), the hedged NS portfolio earns a negative return of −0.71% (t = −4.09),
the hedged O/P portfolio earns a positive return of 0.38% (t = 1.32), and the hedged NO/P
portfolio earns a positive return of 0.66% (t = 2.99). All portfolios earn large and significant
alphas under standard factor models. Panel B, C, and D show that the profitability model does not
capture the NS effect, the FF5 model does not capture the EXFIN and NS effects, and the q-factor
model does not explain the NS and NO/P effects. Panel E, F, and G show that behavioral factors
help fully subsume all of these anomalies, with small H-L alphas and strictly insignificant. The
explanatory power derives from both UMO and ITF.
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Leverage (LEV)
Table 7, Panel A, shows that the leverage effect is rather weak. The H-L leverage portfolio
earns an average return of 0.37% per month, but is only marginally significant (t = 1.63). CAPM
does not capture the positive H-L abnormal returns, while the Fama-French model over-explains it,
owing to extremely strong and positive loading on HML. Both HML and INV help to capture the
leverage effect. UMO shows some explanatory power solely due to its high correlation with HML.
However, ITF and profitability factors (PMU and ROE) go in the wrong direction in explaining
the effect. Overall, except for HML and INV, none of other factors seems to capture the leverage
effect.
To summarize, the two behavioral factors show strong explanatory power on explaining a set
of financing-based anomalies. The profitability model, and FF5 model, and the q-factor model fail
to capture many of these anomalies, while the risk-and-behavioral composite model fully explain
all, except for the leverage effect. ITF goes in the wrong direction in explaining the leverage
effect, while UMO derives its explanatory power for this effect solely from its correlation with
HML. These findings suggest that leverage is indeed a proxy for risk.
3.5 Profitability-related anomalies
This section examines how behavioral factors contribute to explaining 3 profitability-related
anomalies, such as gross profit-to-asset (Novy-Marx (2013)), return-on-equity and return-on-asset
effects.
Gross profit-to-asset (GP/A)
Novy-Marx (2013) argues that the gross profit-to-asset ratio (GP/A) is the “cleanest”
accounting measure of true economic profitability13 and is a strongly positive return predictor. A
13Specifically, Novy-Marx (2013) argues that “Gross profits is the cleanest accounting measure of true economic
profitability. The further down the income statement one goes, the more polluted profitability measures become, and
the less related they are to true economic profitability.” Also, it scales gross profits by book assets, instead of book
equity, “because gross profits are an asset level measure of earnings.”
26
profitability factor, PMU, constructed by going long on high GP/A firms and short on low GP/A
firms, can account for many well-known return anomalies. In this section, we test whether this
GP/A effect can be explained by two behavioral factors.
Table 7, Panel A, shows that high GP/A firms on average earn 0.21% (t = 1.41) higher
returns than low GP/A firms, which is not statistically significant. H-L alphas from the Fama-
French and Carhart models are large and significant, equal to 0.40% (t = 2.63) and 0.34% (t =
2.32) per month, respectively. Panels B, C, and D show that the profitability model, the FF5
model, and the q-factor model completely explain the GP/A effect, owing to the inclusion of the
profitability factors (PMU, CMA, and ROE). Panels E, F, and G show that after adding behavioral
factors to the standard models, H-L alphas are reduced to close to zero, ranging from −0.02%
(t = −0.12) to 0.03% (t = 0.19). Both UMO and ITF contribute to capturing the profitability
premiums.
Return-on-equity(asset) (ROEQ and ROAQ)
Table 7, Panel A, shows a strong ROEQ (quarterly updated) effect. The H-L hedged ROEQ
portfolio earns an excess return of 0.78% per month, highly significantly. None of the standard
models captures the ROE effect. Panel B, C, and D show that the profitability model and the q-
factor model fully capture the effect, owing to the profitability factors (PMU and ROE). However,
the FF5 model fails to explain it, with a large and significant H-L alpha of 0.64% per month
(t = 2.84). Panel E shows that adding two behavioral factors to CAPM help subsume the ROE
effect, with a H-L alpha of 0.47% (t = 1.59), still large in magnitude but statistically insignificant.
However, in Panels F and G, adding behavioral factors to FF3 and Carhart models yield large and
significant alphas again, mostly because SMB and HML explain the effect in the opposite direction.
We have similar evidence on ROAQ hedged portfolios.
To summarize, though the behavioral factors are not formed directly on profitability
characteristics, they exhibit strong power in explaining several robust profitability effects. By
simply adding behavioral factors to CAPM, the composite CAPM performs comparable with the
27
profitability model and the q-factor model in explaining the GP/A, ROE and ROA effects, and
outperforms the FF5 model.
4 Stability of Behavioral Factor Loadings
In this section, we examine whether loadings on the two behavioral factors, UMO and ITF,
are stable or persistent over different time horizons. This test is important to evaluate whether
UMO and ITF are truly behavioral factors. A common presumption for risk factors (such as MKT)
in many monthly return tests is that loadings are persistent over periods of 3 to 5 years. As such,
when estimating risk factor loadings, the standard method is to run rolling window regressions over
the previous 60 months. However, the same presumption may not apply for behavioral factors.
Though a firm characteristic (upon which the behavioral factor is constructed) can be persistently
mispriced by the market, for any individual firm, it will not stay over- or underpriced forever. The
stock price fluctuates between mispriced and fairly priced, as mispricing occurs and is corrected.
Therefore, firms’ loadings on behavioral factors should not be stable over long horizons, such as 3
to 5 years.
We compare the stability of loadings on behavioral factors with loadings on standard risk
factors over a horizon of 3 to 5 years. To test the stability, following Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010),
we first estimate individual firms’ loadings on a certain factor, rank firms in 100 portfolios based
on pre-ranking loadings, estimate each portfolio’s post-ranking loading, and then compare patterns
of pre-ranking and post-ranking loadings across portfolios. By construction, pre-ranking loadings
are monotonically increasing from portfolio 1 to 100. Risk factor loadings are expected to be
fairly stable over long horizons; thus post-ranking loadings should be consistent with pre-ranking
loadings and monotonically increasing across portfolios. In contrast, behavioral factor loadings are
expected to be unstable over time, thus pre-ranking loadings estimated over the past 3 to 5 years
should have little power to predict post-ranking loadings.
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Specifically, to estimate firm loadings on standard risk factors, we follow the common
method of rolling regressions over a 5-year window. First, in each month, firms’ loadings on
MKT, SMB, and HML are estimated by regressing monthly stock returns over the previous 60
months (at least 36 months required) on the Fama-French three-factor model. Then, in June of
each year t, stocks are sorted into 100 portfolios based on their pre-ranking loadings. Each
portfolio’s pre-ranking loadings are the equal-weighted average of all stocks’ pre-ranking
loadings within the portfolio. Equal-weighted average returns of each portfolio are calculated
from July of year t to June of year t + 1, and the portfolios are rebalanced in June of year t + 1.
This will give a full sample period of monthly returns for each of the 100 portfolios. Finally,
portfolios’ post-ranking loadings on MKT, SMB, and HML are estimated by regressing the
full-sample monthly portfolio returns on the Fama-French three factors. To test the stability of
behavioral factors over a horizon of 3 to 5 years, we repeat the procedure. Pre- and post-ranking
loadings on UMO (or ITF) are estimated following the same steps, except that returns are
regressed on the Fama-French three factors plus the UMO (or ITF) factor.
Figure 1 shows patterns of pre-ranking and post-ranking loadings on behavioral factors,
standard risk factors, and other recent factors. We see that post-ranking loadings on standard risk
factors (such as MKT, SMB, and HML) are consistent with pre-ranking loadings and
monotonically increasing from portfolio 1 to 100, suggesting that risk factors loadings are fairly
stable over 3 to 5 years. However, the patterns for behavioral factors are completely different.
While pre-ranking loadings on UMO and ITF monotonically increase across portfolios (by
construction), post-ranking loadings show no explicit patterns. In fact, the post-ranking loadings
are merely flat over 80% of the portfolios. This suggests that UMO and ITF loadings are not
persistent over 3 to 5 years, consistent with their being behavioral factors (since we expect
misvaluation to correct over time).14
14Note that for both standard risk factors and behavioral factors, the dispersion of pre-ranking loadings across
portfolios is considerably larger than that of post-ranking loadings. Daniel and Titman (1997) find similar results
for the HML factor and point out a possible reason that “the preformation factor loading dispersion is due to both
measurement error effects and the actual variation in factor-loadings. The post-formation dispersion results almost
exclusively from true variation in the loadings.”
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Figure 1 also shows the stability of other factors, such as the investment and profitability
factors (INV and ROE) of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2014) and the profitability factor (PMU) of
Novy-Marx (2013). We see that, over 3 to 5 years, loadings on profitability factors (ROE and
PMU) exhibit some degree of persistence (primarily from portfolios with low pre-ranking loadings
or less profitable firms). In contrast, loadings on INV show no pattern of persistence at all, and
post-ranking loadings are essentially flat across pre-ranking portfolios.
Overall, we find that, unlike standard risk factors, firm loadings on UMO and ITF are rather
unstable over a long horizon of 3 to 5 years. This suggests that UMO and ITF are more likely to be
behavioral factors capturing systematic mispricing. In untabulated results, we find that UMO and
ITF loadings seem to persist over a short horizon of 12 to 18 months. Thus, when estimating firm
loadings on UMO and ITF, the common approach for risk factors (rolling regression using monthly
returns over the past 3 to 5 years) will not give accurate estimates. Instead, rolling regression using
daily or weekly returns over the prior year would work better.
5 Return Predictive Ability of Behavioral Factor Loadings
If UMO and ITF are truly behavioral factors that capture return comovement due to common
mispricing, loadings on UMO and ITF measure firms’ exposure to systematically underpriced
fundamental factors or growth-related characteristics, and should positively predict future returns.
In this section, we test how UMO and ITF loadings predict the cross-section of stock returns, using
Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions.
Given that behavioral factor loadings are relatively unstable over long horizons of 3 to 5
years, we estimate UMO and ITF loadings using daily stock returns over the previous 12 months
(at least 100 trading days required). In untabulated results, we find that firm-level βUMO and
βITF estimated by rolling regressions of daily returns are rather weak in predicting future returns,
probably because firm-level loadings are estimated with noise and are relatively imprecise. To
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mitigate an errors-in-variables problem, following the literature, we estimate conditional βUMO
and βITF on portfolio level using a portfolio shrinkage method (see Fama and French (1992), Hou
and Moskowitz (2005), and Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010)).
Specifically, to estimate conditional βITF , at the end of June in year t, all stocks are sorted
into 100 portfolios based on their end-of-June market value and net operating assets of all fiscal
years ending in t − 1. By sorting stocks based on net operating assets, we create dispersion in
the sensitivity to ITF factor. Equal-weighted portfolio returns are calculated from July of year t to
June of t+1, and portfolios are rebalanced in June of year t+1. βITF of each of the 100 portfolios
are estimated by regressing monthly portfolio returns on Fama-French three factors plus the ITF
factor, using a rolling window over the previous 60 months (at least 36 months required). Finally,
the portfolio βITF of each month is assigned to all individual stocks belonging to that portfolio in
that month, named firms’ conditional βITF . Conditional βUMO are estimated similarly, except that
individual stocks are sorted into 100 portfolios first on market value and then on external financing,
and returns are regressed on Fama-French factors plus UMO.
We run Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of monthly stock returns on conditional
UMO and ITF loadings (conditional βUMO and βITF ) and a set of standard control variables,
firm characteristics, and other factor loadings. The standard controls include log(B/M), log(ME),
previous 1-month, 1-year, or 3-year returns to control for short-run contrarian, momentum, and
long-term reversal. Firm characteristics include accruals, total asset growth (AG), net operating
assets (NOA), abnormal capital investment (ACI), investment-to-asset ratio (IVA), net external
financing (EXFIN), composite issuance (IR), net share issuance (NS), and gross profit-to-asset
ratio (GP/A), all of which are known as strong return predictors. Other factor loadings include
conditional βINV and βROE of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2014), and conditional βPMU of Novy-Marx
(2013), estimated by the portfolio shrinkage method as well.
Table 8 reports the regression results for conditional βUMO in Panel A and conditional βITF
in Panel B. Columns (1) and (2) show that both βUMO and βITF strongly and positively predict
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stock returns, with or without standard controls. Columns (3) to (11) include several firm
characteristics known as strong return predictors, and βUMO and βITF still retain some predictive
ability. For example, the predictability of βUMO is not subsumed by accruals, investments (ACI
and IVA), or profitability (GP/A), and βITF is not subsumed by accruals, investments (ACI), or
profitability (GP/A). Columns (12) to (14) run a horse race between conditional βUMO or βITF
and other competing factor loadings such as conditional βINV , βROE , and βPMU . The coefficients
on βUMO remain significant after controlling for βINV and βPMU , but are insignificant after
including βROE . The coefficients on βITF stay significant after controlling for all βINV , βROE ,
and βPMU . In particular, we see that both βUMO and βITF drive out the predictive ability of βINV .
Overall, if estimated precisely, firm loadings on UMO and ITF significantly and positively
predict future stock returns, and this predictive ability remains robust after controlling for standard
return predictors, firm characteristics, and loadings on other recent factors (such as investment
and profitability factors). Thus, UMO and ITF truly capture return comovement due to common
mispricing.
6 Additional Evidence: Aggregate Attention and Sophisticated
Investors
In this section, we conduct a set of robustness tests and provide additional evidence to address
whether UMO and ITF are behavioral factors. Specifically, to evaluate ITF as an inattention factor,
we show how ITF comoves with aggregate investors’ attention to the stock market. Next, on
the premise that sophisticated investors help to mitigate or alleviate mispricing, we look at firm
loadings on UMO and ITF across portfolios ranked by investor sophistication proxies, such as
analyst coverage and institutional ownership.
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6.1 Aggregate Investor Attention
Since the inattention-to-fundamentals factor (ITF) captures common mispricing due to
investors’ limited attention, the ITF premium measures the extent of the mispricing correction.
The lower the attention to firm fundamentals, the greater the mispricing and the larger the ITF
premium. Thus, we investigate how the ITF premium comoves with investors’ attention to the
overall stock market. Following the literature, we use two market state variables to proxy for
aggregate investor attention. The first attention proxy is investor sentiment, which is broadly
defined as “a belief about future cash flows and investment risks that is not justified by the facts at
hand” (Baker and Wurgler (2006)). Since stronger sentiment likely leads investors to misvalue or
neglect firms’ fundamentals, we expect more mispricing during periods in which sentiment is
stronger and larger ITF premiums subsequently. The second attention proxy is NYSE turnover.
Since active trading likely involves investors’ attention to the analysis of asset fundamentals, we
expect less mispricing during high turnover periods and smaller ITF premiums subsequently.
Table 9 reports results of time-series regression of annual ITF premiums on each attention
proxy. The variables of interest are investor sentiment in the previous year SENTt−1, and NYSE
turnover in the previous year TURNt−1.15 We are interested in lagged sentiment and turnover
because the ITF premium measures price correction after high sentiment or turnover increases or
reduces mispricing. As control variables, we also include contemporaneous sentiment and
turnover, and lagged ITF premium. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find positive coefficients
on SENTt−1, meaning that the ITF premium is larger after high sentiment periods, when
investors are more likely to neglect or misvalue firms’ fundamental values, creating greater
mispricing and larger price corrections subsequently. In contrast, we observe a negative
coefficient on TURNt−1, meaning that the ITF premium is smaller after high turnover periods,
when actively trading investors are more likely to analyze asset fundamentals, inducing less
mispricing and smaller price corrections later. Interestingly, the coefficients on contemporaneous
15Annual sentiment index and NYSE turnover data are collected from Professor Jeffrey Wurgler’s web page.
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SENTt and TURNt are of opposite sign. This is because when investors pay greater attention
(in a low sentiment or high turnover period), there are more corrections to pre-existing mispricing
and thus a larger ITF premium contemporaneously.
For comparison, Table 9 also repeat the regressions on the UMO factor, standard risk factors
(MKT, SMB, and HML), and recent investment and profitability factors (RMW, CMA, PMU, INV,
and ROE). For standard risk factors, we see largely no association between factor premiums and
attention proxies (or in the opposite direction). For UMO and other recent factors premiums, we do
not see any sentiment effect, but we observe significant turnover effect for two profitability factors,
PMU and ROE. Collectively, we find that the ITF premiums fluctuate with aggregate investor
attention to the stock market and firm fundamentals in expected directions, while this is largely
not the case for other factors. Though our attention proxies are indirect, the evidence (at least
moderately) supports ITF as an inattention factor that captures common mispricing derived from
investors’ limited attention.
6.2 Analyst Coverage and Institutional Ownership
Next, under the premise that sophisticated investors help to mitigate or alleviate mispricing,
we examine how firms with different levels of investor sophistication load differently on the two
behavioral factors, UMO and ITF. Following the literature, we use institutional ownership as a
direct proxy for sophisticated investors. We also look at analyst coverage, which is correlated with
institutional ownership and is often used as a proxy for investor attention. Analyst coverage is
the average monthly number of analysts providing current fiscal year earnings estimates, averaged
over the previous fiscal year (data provided by I/B/E/S). Institutional ownership is the percentage
of shares held by institutions, based on institutions’ quarterly 13F filings and averaged over the
previous year (data provided by Thomson Reuters).
In Table 10, we examine average UMO and ITF loadings across analyst coverage and
institutional ownership portfolios. If UMO and ITF are indeed behavioral factors, then loadings
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on UMO and ITF (particularly in absolute terms) measure the degree of mispricing; therefore, we
expect firms with high analyst coverage or institutional ownership to have smaller (absolute)
loadings on UMO and ITF. To test this hypothesis, all sample firms are sorted into 3 size groups
(Small, Medium, Large), and within each size group, firms are assigned to 6 groups (0 to 5) based
on analyst coverage (AC) or institutional ownership (IO). Firms with no AC or IO are assigned to
group 0, and all other firms are placed in groups 1 (low) to 5 (high). We compute average firm
loadings on UMO or ITF for each portfolio in each month, which generates a time series of
average UMO or ITF loadings for each of the 18 portfolios (using conditional βUMO and βITF
from Table 8). Then, within each size group, we examine how average βUMO and βITF change
across AC or IO portfolios.
Table 10 shows the results. Panel A shows average loadings across institutional ownership
(IO) portfolios, and in Panel B across analyst coverage (AC) portfolios. For each portfolio, we
compute average βUMO and βITF , as well as average |βUMO| and |βITF | in absolute values. Since
the absolute magnitude of loadings is more relevant to the degree of mispricing, we pay more
attention to absolute loadings.
In Panel A, we see that high IO portfolios have significantly smaller |βUMO| and |βITF | than
zero or low IO portfolios. This pattern is more pronounced among small and medium-size firms,
but seems minimal among large firms. Recall that positive (negative) βUMO and βITF indicate
underpricing (overpricing), and zero loadings indicate fairly priced. Thus, smaller |βUMO| and
|βITF | in absolute terms means less degree of mispricing. Panel B reports average loadings across
AC portfolios. The difference between |βUMO| and |βITF | is not as robust as in Panel A, probably
because analyst coverage is a less clean proxy for investor sophistication than institutional
ownership. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the general notion that sophisticated investors
help mitigate mispricing, particularly for small and medium-sized firms.16
16Interestingly, we also find that small firms on average load positively on UMO and ITF (suggesting underpricing),
whereas large firms load negatively (suggesting overpricing).
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7 Conclusions
This study supplements the standard asset pricing models with behavioral factors to capture
common mispricing caused by psychological biases. Two psychological biases that have been
shown to affect asset prices are overconfidence and limited attention. Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010)
propose a behavioral factor UMO based on firms’ financing activities, motivated by the theory
of investor overconfidence. We add to the literature an inattention-to-fundamentals (ITF) factor,
derived from the theory of investors’ limited attention. Moreover, UMO is built on firms’ equity
and debt financing activities, and ITF is built on net operating assets, both related to firms’ long-
term growth prospects. Therefore, we further posit that UMO and ITF capture common mispricing,
in particular on long-term growth.
To test the hypotheses, we add behavioral factors (UMO and ITF) to the standard factor
models (CAPM, Fama-French, and Carhart models) to form risk-and-behavioral composite
models, and examine how well the composite models explain well-known return anomalies,
especially long-term growth-related anomalies. This approach is consistent with theoretical
models in which both risk and misvaluation proxies predict returns. For comparison, we also test
the performance of other recent models, including the profitability factor model of Novy-Marx
(2013), the Fama-French five-factor model of Fama and French (2014), and the q-factor model of
Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2014). Overall, we find that the risk-and-behavioral composite models
outperform standard models and other recent models and fully explain around 20 growth-related
anomalies examined, while showing relatively weak power to the leverage, ROE, and ROA
effects. Our evidence suggests that both risk and mispricing are important sources of return
comovement and predictability.
There are several other notable findings. First, the Fama-French five-factor model and the
q-factor model (with built-in investment factors) do not fully explain several investment-related
anomalies, such as the total accruals, investment-to-asset, and inventory changes effects, whereas
the risk-and-behavioral composite models do. Second, though neither UMO nor ITF is
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constructed directly on profitability measures, the composite CAPM performs comparable to the
profitability model and the q-factor model (with built-in profitability factors) and fully explains
several profitability effects.
We conduct additional tests to corroborate whether UMO and ITF are indeed priced
behavioral factors that capture return comovement. If UMO and ITF are indeed behavioral
factors, then UMO and ITF loadings should be fairly unstable over time. A common presumption
for risk factors is that loadings are persistent over periods of 3 to 5 years. However, the same
presumption may not apply for behavioral factors. Though a firm characteristic (upon which the
behavioral factor is constructed) can be persistently mispriced by the market, for a given firm, it
will not stay over- or underpriced forever. The degree of mispricing will fluctuate, with a
tendency to correct toward zero. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that, unlike standard
risk factors, UMO and ITF loadings are not stable over long horizons of 3 to 5 years.
If UMO and ITF capture return comovement, then loadings on UMO and ITF measure
firms’ exposure to systematically underpriced fundamental factors or growth characteristics, and
therefore should positively predict the cross-section of stock returns. By both portfolio analysis
and firm-level Fama-MacBeth regression, we confirm that conditional UMO and ITF loadings
(estimated on annually rebalanced portfolios) positively and significantly predict future returns,
even after controlling for a set of standard return predictors, firm characteristics, and loadings on
competing factors such as the investment and profitability factors.
Finally, we conduct a set of robustness tests to provide additional evidence supportive of
UMO and ITF as behavioral factors. First, we evaluate ITF as an inattention factor by showing
that ITF comoves with aggregate investors’ attention to the stock market. Next, on the premise
that sophisticated investors help to mitigate or alleviate mispricing, we find that firms with high
analyst coverage or institutional ownership have smaller loadings on UMO and ITF in absolute
terms (suggesting less degree of mispricing), but only among small and medium-sized firms.
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To summarize, in this study, we introduce an inattention-to-fundamentals factor that captures
common mispricing due to investors’ limited attention. We evaluate how behavioral factors (such
as UMO and ITF) differ from standard risk factors on important aspects. More important, we
add behavioral factors to standard factor models to form risk-and-behavioral composite models,
and find that the composite models can fully explain many robust return anomalies. The broader
message of the study is that it is useful to give behavioral-motivated as well as traditional return
factors a prominent role in understanding return comovement and predictability. There is strong
evidence that behavioral factors are important in capturing common misvaluation and should be
incorporated into asset pricing models.
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Figure 1: Stability of Factor Loadings over Long Horizons
This figure plots pre-ranking and post-ranking loadings of 100 sorted portfolios on behavioral factors (UMO, ITF),
standard factors (MKT, SMB, HML), and other recent factors (INV, ROE, PMU). The dashed line represents
pre-ranking loadings across 100 portfolios, and the scatter plot represents post-ranking loadings. Pre-ranking
loadings on MKT, SMB, and HML are estimated by regressing monthly stocks returns over the previous 60 months
(at least 36 months required) on the Fama-French three-factor model. Then, in June of each year t, stocks are sorted
into 100 portfolios based on their pre-ranking loadings. Each portfolio’s pre-ranking loading is the equal-weighted
average of all stocks’ pre-ranking loadings within the portfolio. Equal-weighted average returns of each portfolio are
calculated from July of year t to June of year t+ 1, and the portfolios are rebalanced in June of year t+ 1. This will
give a full sample period of monthly returns for each of the 100 portfolios. Finally, portfolios’ post-ranking loadings
on MKT, SMB and HML are estimated by regressing the full-sample monthly portfolio returns on the Fama-French
three-factor model. Pre- and post-ranking loadings on behavioral factors (UMO and ITF) and other recent factors
(INV, ROE, and PMU) are estimated similarly, except that returns are regressed on the Fama-French three-factor
model plus the target factor. To facilitate comparison across different factors, all pre- and post-ranking loadings are
demeaned on a monthly basis. The sample period is from July 1972 to December 2012.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Factor Portfolios
Panel A reports summary statistics of standard factors, behavioral factors, and other recent factors. LIQ is the traded
liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). PMU is the profitability factor of Novy-Marx (2013). INV and ROE
are the investment and profitability factors of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2014). RMW and CMA are the investment and
profitability factors of Fama and French (2014). UMO is the behavioral factor proposed by Hirshleifer and Jiang
(2010), and ITF is the inattention factor that we introduce. Monthly returns of MKT, SMB, HML, MOM, RMW, and
CMA are from Kenneth French’s website. LIQ and UMO premiums are from corresponding authors’ websites.
Following Novy-Marx (2013), PMU is constructed based on gross profit-to-asset ratios. Following Hou, Xue, and
Zhang (2014), INV and ROE are constructed by a triple sort on size, asset growth, and quarterly return on equity. ITF
is constructed based on net operating assets. The Sharpe ratio (SR) is the ratio of mean excess return over return
standard deviation. Panel B reports Pearson correlations between factor portfolios. Panel C reports summary statistics
of ex post tangency portfolios. Portfolio weights are calculated as (`′V −1µ)−1V −1µ, where ` is a k × 1 vector of
ones, V is the covariance matrix of factor returns, and µ is mean factor return. The sample period is from 1972 to
2012.
Panel A: Factor portfolio premiums
Premium Std t SR N. Obs
MKT 0.47 4.66 2.23 0.10 486
SMB 0.19 3.16 1.30 0.06 486
HML 0.42 3.04 3.08 0.14 486
MOM 0.69 4.54 3.37 0.15 486
LIQ 0.46 3.62 2.81 0.13 486
PMU 0.13 2.30 1.23 0.06 486
INV 0.48 2.06 5.11 0.23 486
ROE 0.55 3.10 3.89 0.18 486
RMW 0.29 2.27 2.80 0.13 486
CMA 0.39 1.98 4.33 0.20 486
ITF 0.32 1.57 4.45 0.20 486
UMO 0.91 3.06 6.52 0.30 486
Panel B: Correlation matrix of factor portfolios
MKT SMB HML MOM LIQ PMU INV ROE RMW CMA ITF
SMB 0.28
HML -0.33 -0.24
MOM -0.14 -0.01 -0.15
LIQ -0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.04
PMU 0.15 0.19 -0.52 0.11 -0.02
INV -0.34 -0.21 0.59 0.09 -0.03 -0.30
ROE -0.21 -0.35 -0.06 0.60 -0.06 0.24 0.13
RMW -0.23 -0.44 0.16 0.09 0.01 0.32 0.10 0.58
CMA -0.40 -0.12 0.70 0.02 0.03 -0.39 0.78 -0.03 -0.03
ITF -0.12 -0.01 -0.19 0.18 0.02 0.22 0.26 0.07 -0.14 0.21
UMO -0.50 -0.20 0.62 0.20 -0.01 -0.14 0.56 0.26 0.31 0.62 0.06
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Table 10: Institutional Ownership and Analyst Coverage
This table reports average UMO and ITF loadings across analyst coverage or institutional ownership portfolios. First,
all sample firms are sorted into 3 size groups (Small, Medium, Large), and then within each size group, firms are
assigned to 6 groups (0 to 5) based on analyst coverage (AC) and institutional ownership (IO). Firms with no AC or
IO are assigned to group 0, and all other firms are assigned to group 1 (low) to 5 (high). Analyst coverage is the
average monthly number of analysts providing current fiscal year earnings estimates, averaged over the previous
fiscal year. Institutional ownership is the percentage of shares held by institutions, based on institutions’ quarterly
13F filings and averaged over the previous year. Then, for each portfolio in each month, we compute average firm
loadings on UMO and ITF and average “absolute” loadings, using conditional βUMO and βITF from Table 8. Panel
A reports average (absolute) firm loadings on UMO and ITF across institutional ownership portfolios, and in Panel B
across analyst coverage portfolios. The sample period starts from 1982/07 to 2012/12 for analyst coverage and from
1981/01 to 2012/12 for institutional ownership, restricted by data availability. Newey-West corrected t-statistics are
reported in parentheses.
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Panel A: Institutional Ownership Portfolios
0 1 2 3 4 5 High-Low High-Zero
Average βUMO
Small 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.10 -0.05* -0.02
(2.08) (2.68) (3.18) (2.86) (2.74) (2.42) (-1.68) (-0.67)
Medium -0.11 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.01 0.04***
(-3.81) (-2.76) (-2.33) (-2.54) (-2.54) (-2.62) (0.84) (4.18)
Large -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.00 0.00
(-3.71) (-3.59) (-3.14) (-3.04) (-3.42) (-3.43) (-0.06) (0.65)
Average βITF
Small 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.17 -0.04* -0.08***
(3.63) (2.92) (2.98) (3.24) (3.12) (3.18) (-1.76) (-4.28)
Medium 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.03 -0.02 -0.13*** -0.10***
(2.29) (2.98) (2.94) (2.12) (1.50) (-0.99) (-5.59) (-5.36)
Large -0.27 -0.20 -0.22 -0.24 -0.23 -0.25 -0.05*** 0.02
(-12.94) (-11.06) (-12.08) (-12.40) (-12.36) (-13.60) (-4.41) (1.60)
Average |βUMO|
Small 0.55 0.56 0.52 0.48 0.44 0.40 -0.16*** -0.15***
(21.87) (18.17) (20.26) (20.67) (24.56) (25.17) (-7.76) (-9.83)
Medium 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 -0.04*** -0.04***
(22.64) (23.91) (25.54) (24.29) (22.86) (21.68) (-5.95) (-8.24)
Large 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.22 -0.02** 0.00
(16.66) (18.96) (19.83) (19.31) (18.80) (16.79) (-2.43) (0.40)
Average |βITF |
Small 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.55 0.51 0.47 -0.12*** -0.12***
(20.04) (18.63) (19.12) (18.09) (19.75) (19.50) (-9.95) (-12.49)
Medium 0.41 0.42 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.34 -0.08*** -0.07***
(37.17) (33.11) (39.48) (45.09) (55.32) (50.96) (-6.91) (-9.28)
Large 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.03*** -0.01*
(33.39) (36.52) (33.57) (31.71) (31.63) (31.86) (4.38) (-1.96)
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Panel B: Analyst Coverage Portfolios
0 1 2 3 4 5 High-Low High-Zero
Average βUMO
Small 0.14 0.06 -0.11 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.09*** -0.17***
(2.98) (1.46) (-1.64) (0.39) (-0.20) (-0.66) (-7.39) (-9.91)
Medium -0.04 -0.06 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13 -0.17 -0.12*** -0.13***
(-1.53) (-2.22) (-3.18) (-3.76) (-4.49) (-5.95) (-12.29) (-11.04)
Large -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02*** -0.01
(-3.10) (-2.39) (-3.68) (-4.05) (-4.00) (-3.81) (-3.19) (-1.31)
Average βITF
Small 0.20 0.17 -0.32 0.15 0.11 0.13 -0.04** -0.07***
(2.83) (2.73) (-2.69) (2.31) (1.67) (2.43) (-2.24) (-2.86)
Medium 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.14*** -0.14***
(2.44) (2.92) (2.41) (2.15) (0.69) (-1.73) (-7.76) (-5.77)
Large -0.16 -0.18 -0.26 -0.27 -0.29 -0.26 -0.09*** -0.10***
(-6.65) (-9.43) (-11.55) (-13.76) (-15.84) (-13.43) (-6.28) (-5.71)
Average |βUMO|
Small 0.52 0.43 0.35 0.43 0.44 0.41 -0.02 -0.11***
(18.75) (22.95) (16.25) (23.75) (26.95) (23.88) (-1.21) (-4.07)
Medium 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.03*** 0.03**
(24.10) (25.27) (23.25) (21.74) (21.67) (18.71) (3.06) (2.40)
Large 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.19 -0.05*** -0.04***
(19.18) (20.19) (18.30) (17.43) (17.24) (15.84) (-6.52) (-3.24)
Average |βITF |
Small 0.58 0.53 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.46 -0.07*** -0.12***
(18.58) (18.19) (12.29) (17.73) (15.41) (18.11) (-6.64) (-9.40)
Medium 0.41 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 -0.01 -0.04***
(32.44) (38.00) (48.56) (49.90) (48.60) (39.02) (-0.88) (-2.89)
Large 0.35 0.34 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.05*** 0.03***
(26.04) (30.05) (26.75) (32.53) (35.84) (31.58) (5.90) (2.93)
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Appendix
A Definition of Anomaly Variables
Accruals: Following Sloan (1996), we measure operating accruals as Accruals = [(∆Current Assets –
∆Cash) – (∆Current Liabilities – ∆Short-term Debt – ∆Taxes Payable) – Depreciation and Amortization
Expense]/Lagged Total Assets, where Current Assets is ACT (Compustat item #4), Cash is CHE (Compustat
item #1), Current Liabilities is LCT (Compustat item #5), Short-term Debt is DLC (Compustat item #34),
Taxes Payable is TXP (Compustat item #71), Depreciation and Amortization Expense is DP (Compustat
item #14), and Total Assets is AT (Compustat item #6).
Asset Growth (AG): Following Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008), asset growth is defined percentage change
in total asset (Compustat item #6), scaled by beginning total asset.
Net operating assets (NOA): Following Hirshleifer et al. (2004), we define net operating assets as NOA =
(Operating Assets – Operating Liabilities)/Lagged Total Assets, where Operating Assets = Total Assets(AT,
#6) – Cash and Short-term Investment (CHE, #1), and Operating Liabilities = Total Assets (AT, #6) – Short-
term Debt (DLC, #34) – Long-term Debt (DLTT, #9) – Minority Interest (MIB, #38) – Preferred Stock
(PSTK, #130) - Common Equity (CEQ, #60).
Abnormal capital investment (ACI): Following Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), we measure abnormal capital
investment as a firm’s capital expenditures scaled by the moving-average of its past capital expenditures over
the previous three years. Specifically, ACIt−1 = CEt−1/[(CEt−2 +CEt−3 +CEt−4)/3]− 1, where CE
is capital expenditure (CAPX, #128) scaled by sales (SALE, #12).
Investment-to-asset ratio (IVA): Following Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2008), we measure the investment-
to-asset ratio as the annual change in gross property, plant, and equipment (PPEGT, #7) plus the annual
change in inventories (INVT, #3) divided by the lagged total assets (AT, #6).
Investment-to-capital (IK): Following Polk and Sapienza (2009), we measure the investment-to-capital
ratio as capital expenditure (CAPX, #128) over beginning-of-year net property, plant, and equipment
(PPENT, #8).
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Investment growth (IG): Following Xing (2008), we measure investment growth as the percentage change
in capital expenditure (CAPX, #128).
Inventory growth (IvG): Following Belo and Lin (2012), we measure inventory growth as the ratio of
inventory (Compustat item INVT) of fiscal year ending in year t− 1 over inventory of the fiscal year ending
in t− 2.
Inventory changes (IvC): Following Thomas and Zhang (2002), we measure inventory changes as the
change in inventory (Compustat item INVT) from the fiscal year ending in year t − 2 to the fiscal year
ending in t − 1, scaled by the average of total assets (Compustat item AT) for fiscal years ending in t − 2
and t− 1.
Total payout (O/P) and net payout (NO/P): Following Boudoukh et al. (2007), total payout (O) is dividend
on common stock (Compustat item DVC) plus repurchase, where repurchase is the purchase of common and
preferred stock (PRSTKC) plus any reduction (negative change over the prior year) in the value of the net
number of preferred stocks outstanding (PSTKRV). Net payout (NO) is total payout minus equity issuance,
which is the sale of common and preferred stock (SSTK) minus any increase (positive change over the prior
year) in the value of the net number of preferred stocks outstanding (PSTKRV). P is the market value of
equity at the end of December of the fiscal year end.
External financing (EXFIN): Following Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2006), external financing is
defined as the net amount of cash flow received from external financing activities, including net equity and
debt financing, scaled by total assets. Specifically, net equity financing is defined as the sale of common
and preferred stock (SSTK) minus the purchase of common and preferred stock (PRSTKC) minus cash
dividends paid (DV). Net debt financing is defined as the issuance of long-term debt (DLTIS) minus the
reduction in long-term debt (DLTR). But different from Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2006), we do
not include change in current debt in calculating net debt financing to avoid including natural retirement
of short-term debt which is not a market timing choice17. Thus, EXFINt−1 is measured as net equity
financing in year t− 1 plus net debt financing in year t− 1, scaled by the average of beginning and ending
total assets of year t− 1.
17This revised definition of EXFIN is consistent with Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010).
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Composite issuance (IR): Following Daniel and Titman (2006), we measure composite issuance as the
growth rate in market equity that is not attributable to the stock returns, IRt = log(MEt/MEt−5)− r(t−
5, t). Specifically, for IR in June of year t, MEt is the market equity at the end of June in year t, MEt−5 is
the market equity at the end of June in year t − 5, and r(t − 5, t) is the cumulative log return on the stock
from end of June in year t− 5 to end of June in year t.
Net stock issues (NS): Following Pontiff and Woodgate (2008), we measure net stock issues of fiscal year
t− 1 as the natural log of the ratio of split-adjusted shares outstanding of fiscal year t− 1 to split-adjusted
shares outstanding of fiscal year t−2. The split-adjusted shares outstanding is the common share outstanding
(CSHO, #25) times the adjustment factor (AJEX, #27).
Leverage (LEV): Following Ferguson and Shockley (2003), we measure a firm’s leverage of year t − 1 as
the book value of total liabilities (LT, #181) of fiscal year ending in year t−1 over the market value of equity
at the end of December of year t− 1.
Gross profit-to-asset ratio (GP/A): Following Novy-Marx (2013), we define a firm’s gross profit-to-asset
ratio (GP/At) as total revenue (REV Tt) minus cost of goods sold (COGSt) adjusted by total asset (ATt).
ROAQ and ROEQ: ROAQ and ROEQ are computed using Compustat quarterly files.
ROAQ is income before extraordinary items (IBQ) divided by one-quarter lagged total assets (ATQ).
ROEQ is income before extraordinary items (IBQ) divided by one-quarter lagged book equity. Book equity
is shareholders’ equity, plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (TXDITCQ), minus book value of
preferred stocks. Shareholders’ equity is shareholders’ equity (SEQQ), or common equity (CEQQ) plus the
carrying value of preferred stocks(PSTKQ), or total assets (ATQ) minus total liabilities (LTQ), depending
on data availability. Book value of preferred stocks equal the redemption value (PSTKRQ) if available, or
the carrying value of preferred stocks(PSTKQ).
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